« It's a Mystery » : the Royal Prerogative of Mercy in England, Canada and South Africa by Turrell, Rob
 Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History &
Societies 
Vol. 4, n°1 | 2000
Varia
« It's a Mystery » : the Royal Prerogative of Mercy
in England, Canada and South Africa
Rob Turrell
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chs/850
DOI: 10.4000/chs.850
ISSN: 1663-4837
Publisher
Librairie Droz
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 January 2000
Number of pages: 83-101
ISBN: 2-600-00433-5
ISSN: 1422-0857
 
Electronic reference
Rob Turrell, « « It's a Mystery » : the Royal Prerogative of Mercy in England, Canada and South Africa », 
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies [Online], Vol. 4, n°1 | 2000, Online since 02 April
2009, connection on 01 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chs/850  ; DOI : 10.4000/
chs.850 
© Droz
«It's a Mystery»: 
the Royal Prerogative of Mercy 
in England, Canada and South Africa 
Rob Turrell1 
This essay asks the question : on what grounds were murderers reprieved 
in England, Canada and South Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries? It weighs up three interpretations. Radzinowicz and Hood argue that 
mercy decisions were made on the basis of the law. Murders committed with 
the two elements of deliberation and planning were punished by death. Roger 
Chadwick argues that execution depended on the social and moral meaning 
of a murder and not the legal definition of an intent to kill. And, third, Carolyn 
Strange argues that mercy in Canada was awarded arbitrarily. Hanging was 
a form of lottery. A detailed examination of judicial and administrative mercy 
reports in South Africa reveals that decisions were made on the basis of a 
legal definition of intent, but that the finding of intent was always determined 
by the social and moral meaning of a murder. To illustrate this point three 
similar domestic and intra-racial South African murders are examined in 
detail. 
Cet article porte sur les motivations de la grâce des meurtriers en 
Angleterre, au Canada et en Afrique du Sud aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Il évalue 
trois interprétations: Radzinowicz et Hood affirment que les décisions de 
grâce se fondaient sur des motifs juridiques. Les homicides qui étaient à la 
fois délibérés et préparés étaient punis de mort. Roger Chadwick estime que 
l'exécution dépendait de la signification sociale et morale du meurtre et non 
de la qualification légale de l'intention homicide. Troisièmement, Carolyn 
Strange prétend, qu 'au Canada, la grâce était accordée arbitrairement. La 
pendaison était une sorte de loterie. L'examen détaillé des dossiers adminis-
tratifs et judiciaires de grâce Sud-africains montre que les décisions repo-
saient sur une définition légale de l'intention, mais que l'analyse de 
l'intention était toujours déterminée par la signification sociale et morale de 
l'homicide. Trois meurtres sud-africains, analogues par leur caractère 
domestique et intra-racial, sont analysés en détail pour étayer cette thèse. 
In Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice there are those memorable lines that express the meaning of mercy: 
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The quality of mercy is not strain'd; 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath: it is twice blessed; 
It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes: 
«Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes 
The throned monarch better than his crown: 
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, 
The attribute to awe and majesty, 
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 
But mercy is above this sceptered sway, 
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, 
It is an attribute of God himself. 
Mercy had long been an attribute of the monarch and derived from his or her 
divine right to rule. But mercy was, in Douglas Hay's classic account of eighteenth-
century England, a discretionary instrument whose exercise confirmed the mental 
structures of paternalism and deference in a justification of the social order. «It 
allowed the rulers of England to make the courts a selective instrument of class 
justice, yet simultaneously to proclaim the law's incorruptible impartiality, and 
absolute determinacy,' explained Hay. (...) It allowed the class that passed one of the 
bloodiest penal codes in Europe to congratulate itself on its humanity » 2. At this time 
a multitude of property offences were capital crimes, but by 1861 capital punish-
ment was effectively restricted to murder alone. In what follows I try to unravel the 
mystery of mercy in the post-1861 period in England and two of its former colonies, 
Canada and South Africa. 
1. - PREMEDITATION AND ENGLISH MURDER LAW 
If a murderer was convicted in England and Wales between the years of 1861 
and 1957, he or she was sentenced to death. There was a mandatory death penalty 
for murder. The English common law defined murder «as unlawful killing with 
malice aforethought» 3. But by 1861 malice had long ceased to mean malice (that is, 
ill-will), and aforethought had also come adrift from its original meaning (premedi-
tation). How, then, did judges instruct juries on finding an intent to kill or «malice 
aforethought»? There were two main (there were more) forms of malice. First, 
malice (the intent, the mens rea, the guilty mind) was express when the killer had 
made preparations, used threats or said something immediately before or after the 
assault that revealed his intention to kill. Second, malice was implied from the place 
the victim was struck on the body, the weapon used (the use of a firearm implied an 
intent to kill, but not the use of a light stick) or the number of blows inflicted (one 
blow might indicate an intent to injure, but twenty stab wounds implied an intent to 
kill). In the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century most murderers 
were hanged on the doctrine that a man intended the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts. This doctrine of implied malice, of course, made it much easier 
2
 Hay (1977, p. 48). 
3
 Gowers(1956,p. 33). 
THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF MERCY IN ENGLAND, CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA 85 
for the Crown to win a conviction. It was much more difficult to gather an intent to 
kill from threats or plans made, especially where most murderers were illiterate. 
What this meant was that premeditation was not a requirement for a murder 
conviction. For example, in 1879 Lord Justice The singer told a jury «that it was not 
necessary to find premeditation in order to convict of murder, but only that the deed 
was committed with what is legally called malice, that is to say with a wicked or 
cruel mind» 4 . This was in sharp contrast to the murder law in most American states, 
where there was a division into capital and non-capital murder on the basis of « pre-
meditation ». Although the law varied in detail from state to state, all states relied on 
the original model of the 1794 Pennsylvania Statute. First-degree murder included 
murders «(a) perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other 
kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing » and «(b) committed in the per-
petration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary » 5. Second-
degree murder included all other murders that were murder at common law. 
The most extended English attempt to devise a legal way of restricting hanging 
to the most heinous murders was undertaken in the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment (1949-1953). It had long been recognised that there were many diffe-
rent types of murders and that they were not all equally culpable. « There is proba-
bly no offence », wrote Ernest Gowers, the Chairman of the Commission, in the little 
book he published to popularise the Commission's conclusions, «that varies so 
widely both in character and in moral guilt as that which falls within the legal defi-
nition of murder» 6 . When the Commission sat the only way of confining hanging to 
the worst murders was through the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. The Prerogative 
was exercised in secret on the King's behalf by the Home Secretary and in the first 
half of the twentieth-century he reprieved half of those sentenced to death. There 
were some well-worn objections to this Prerogative, perhaps no better expressed 
than by Mr Justice Devlin: 
... the Prerogative of Mercy is now perforce being used in circumstances for 
which it was never designed, not for the exercise of mercy but for the determina-
tion of justice. The inquiry into the appropriate sentence which, in accordance 
with all our traditions, ought to be dealt with in open court and with the right of 
appeal, has to be conducted in camera and without appeal on facts that may or 
may not have emerged in evidence and been tested in cross-examination... 
Traditionally, we have insisted that the subject should be protected by forms of 
law; that is what we mean by saying that no man shall be condemned save by due 
process of law. The law does not achieve that by telling those to whom it has 
denied justice that they can always sue for mercy7. 
What alternatives were there to the mercy prerogative? The most popular alter-
native the Royal Commission considered was the American option of two degrees 
of murder. But the Commission decided that premeditation was not a valid ground 
on which to divide murder. «A sudden killing may be the direct expression of an 
4
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5
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incorrigibly vicious nature », the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-
1953 noted, « while a premeditated and deliberate murder may be among the most 
excusable » 8 . The Royal Commission found, according to Ernest Gowers' summary, 
that there had been two unfortunate consequences of the two-degree murder law in 
America. First, there had been some judgements that lacked common sense. «In one 
State it has been held that an instant of time is enough to admit of premeditation », 
wrote Gowers. « That makes nonsense of the distinction; premeditation becomes the 
same as intent ». Second, juries ignored the law and found an accused guilty of first-
degree murder if they thought he ought to die, and of second degree if they thought 
there was some mitigating factor. «What we have is merely a privilege offered to the 
jury to find the lesser degree when the suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of 
the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the exercise of mercy», wrote the New 
York judge, Justice Cardozo, in 1930. «I have no objection to giving them this 
power, but it should be given to them directly, and not in a mystifying cloud of 
words» 9 . In the light of this, and much other weighty consideration, the Royal 
Commission concluded that there was simply no way to classify murder: «the 
object of our search is chimerical and must be abandoned» 1 0. And the English 
murder law remained unaltered until the 1957 Homicide Act made certain catego-
ries of murder non-capital and that in turn was a short remove from a moratorium on 
executions in 1961 and the abolition of capital punishment in 1966. 
2. - ENGLAND: MERCY RULES OK 
On what grounds, then, did the Home Secretary reprieve half of those and more 
murderers sentenced to death under the mandatory death penalty ? There are three 
conflicting historical interpretations of the way mercy was exercised. The first sug-
gests that decisions were made on the basis of the law. Leon Radzinowicz and Roger 
Hood argue in their History of English Criminal Law (1986), based on published 
and printed Home Office sources, that the Home Secretary distinguished between 
two degrees of murder in granting mercy. The distinction was based on a recom-
mendation of the 1866 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment that defined first-
degree murder «as all murders deliberately committed with express malice 
aforethought, such malice to be found as a fact by the jury...». The essence of 
deliberation is a calm contemplation of an act and its consequences. Cold-
blooded was a popular synonym for deliberate. The essence of express malice is evi-
dence of planning in the crime. It is quite possible to have a deliberate murder that 
is not planned. And it is quite possible to have a planned murder that is not delibe-
rate, but rather the result of a disturbed or unhinged mind. Thus, first-degree 
murders, containing the two elements of deliberation and planning, were to be 
punished by death. Second-degree murders were to be punished by a gaol sentence 
of from seven years to life. The numerous attempts to change the murder law in 
this direction all failed in the House of Commons. Yet in practice, say Radzinowicz 
8
 Gowers (1956, p. 37). 
9
 Gowers (1956, p. 38). 
1 0
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and Hood, the Home Secretary simply used this unacceptable legal distinction in 
the exercise of mercy 1 1 . 
The second interpretation argues that mercy decisions were made through an 
assessment of the social and moral meaning of a murder. Roger Chadwick, who exa-
mined capital case files in the Home Office during the late Victorian period, argues 
that Home Secretaries seldom queried the jury's finding of an intent to kill. Instead, 
they commuted on the basis of other mitigating factors. «Who was killed, how was 
it done, were all questions whose answers seem to have affected the imputations of 
malice» 1 2 . What this meant was that intention, despite its legal definition, was 
always socially determined in the granting of mercy. Home Secretaries had to deter-
mine what was a bad murder. They did not use premeditation, as Chadwick thinks 
Radzinowicz and Hood suggest, to differentiate murders. They had to assess the 
social meaning of homicide. «The decisions which they came to in this respect», 
wrote Chadwick, « are at once the most important indications of the values which 
they sought to protect and the most elusive » 1 3 . 
This social and moral approach to mercy was what the Home Office itself 
dubbed as «no fixed rules». In 1874 a Home Office internal memo stated that the 
Prerogative of Mercy was « governed by no fixed rules or forms of procedure » 1 4 . 
But « no fixed rules » did not mean that there were no rules in deciding on mercy. It 
simply meant that the rules were not fixed. In 1907 Herbert Gladstone, the Home 
Secretary (1905-1910), gave the best insight into the way mercy was exercised: 
It would be neither desirable nor possible to lay down hard and fast rules as to the 
exercise of the prerogative of mercy. Numerous considerations - the motive, the 
degree of premeditation or deliberation, the amount of provocation, the state of 
mind of the prisoner, his physical condition, his character and antecedents, the 
recommendation or absence of recommendation from the jury, and many others -
have to be taken into account in every case: and the decision depends on a full 
review of a complex combination of circumstances and often on the careful 
balancing of conflicting considerations (...)15. 
Here, it is important to note that in addition to « no fixed rules » Gladstone mentions 
the degree of premeditation or deliberation in his bundle of factors to be weighed in 
mitigation of murder. 
Sir Edward Troup, who started in the Criminal Department in 1880 as a clerk and 
became Permanent Under-Secretary in 1908, was able to reveal in his book on the 
Home Office published in 1925 that an archive of rule and precedent made it pos-
sible to decide on mercy very quickly. Although he was careful to say that «no 
11
 Radzinowicz, Hood (1986, pp. 677-681). 
1 2
 Chadwick (1992, p. 387). 
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general principle can be formulated», there were «certain classes of cases in which 
something approaching to a rule can be laid down» 1 6 . Here is Troup's list of nine 
rules: first, no one under 18 was executed, while above that age youth was «one of 
the considerations to which weight is given, but which is not by itself conclusive in 
the case of a cold blooded and cruel murder»; second, infanticides were reprieved 
and had been since 1849, but baby farmers were executed; third, constructive malice 
in murder presented difficulties because arson and rape had led to horrible crimes; 
fourth, abortion was technically murder, but judges allowed a manslaughter finding; 
fifth, survivors of suicide pacts were treated mercifully and given short sentences; 
sixth, « provocation sometimes is, and sometimes is not, a sufficient reason for com-
mutation of the capital sentence » and here cases ranged from clear evidence of an 
unhinged mind, which was treated mercifully, to clear evidence of revenge, which 
was not, but most cases lay between these two extremes and were decided on other 
considerations like age or character; seventh, drink was assessed similarly to provo-
cation ; eighth, a jury's mercy recommendation was usually honoured provided there 
was «some reasonable ground» and the judge agreed; ninth, insane murderers were 
not hanged but sent to Broadmoor, and borderline insanity cases, «though negatived 
by the jury or not raised at the trial», were considered after conviction 1 7. 
Twenty five years later the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-
1953) learned from the Home Office that the exercise of mercy was based on a 
«broad-based body of doctrine» and that decisions gave rise to little difficulty. 
Reprieves were « foregone » in cases of mercy killings, suicide pacts, infanticide and 
maternal child murder. There were other types of murder that were considered for 
reprieve and here the Commission noted insanity, youth, drink and provocation in 
similar terms to that spelt out by Troup in his book. What was different to Troup was 
a number of new categories of murder considered suitable for reprieve. Here there 
was a new concern with premeditation. First, « unpremeditated murders committed 
in some sudden excess of frenzy, where the murderer has previously had no evil 
animus towards his victim, especially if he is weak-minded or emotionally unstable 
to an abnormal degree ». Second, «murder committed without intent to kill... in 
course of a quarrel». Third, murders committed by two or more people with diffe-
rent degrees of responsibility. Fourth, there was a «natural reluctance» to hang 
women and, in the words of the Home Office memo to the Commission, «there have 
been occasions on which the Home Secretary of the day has expressly had regard to 
the prisoner's sex in deciding to recommend commutation». Fifth, high-profile 
cases were affected by the force of public opinion. Mercy was occasionally exten-
ded « on the ground that it would do more harm than good to carry out the sentence 
if the result was to arouse sympathy for the offender and hostility to the law » 1 8 . 
3. - CANADA: NO MERCY RULES 
The third interpretation of the exercise of mercy was that there were « no rules ». 
The award of mercy was arbitrary or akin to a game of chance. Hanged men and 
1 6
 Troup (1925, p. 65). 
1 7
 Troup (1925, pp. 55-71). 
18
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women drew short straws in a lottery. This view has been argued by the Canadian 
historian, Carolyn Strange 1 9. Canadian mercy practice was derived from the English 
Home Office and the mandatory death penalty for murder was maintained in Canada 
until 1961. Unlike in England where the responsibility for mercy lay with the Home 
Secretary alone, in Canada the Governor-General was responsible for mercy subject 
to the advice of his cabinet. 
Twentieth-century Canadian capital-case records are open to the public and in a 
researcher-friendly form. This is in stark contrast to England where the files are 
closed for a hundred years. The Canadian archives contain trial transcripts, judges' 
reports, Justice Department evaluations, and cabinet decisions. For some wonderful 
and unexplained reason the National Archives of Canada has created a dataset of the 
contents of these files in DBase4 format. This means that researchers can quantify 
accused and victims' age, race, occupation, marital status, religion, as well as 
judges' conviction records, their jurisdictions, the weapons used, and the motives 
for murders in 1,533 cases between 1867 (Confederation) and 1976 (abolition of 
capital punishment). Quantification reveals that mercy was awarded in a discrimi-
natory fashion. There appears to be no quarrel with this conclusion. According to 
Strange the murderers most likely to be executed in Canada between 1926 and 1957 
were « offenders with prior criminal records; labourers; Aboriginals, ethnic minori-
ties or French Canadians; murderers of policemen or high-status victims; those 
whose crimes were particularly brutal, or who committed murder in the course of 
another felony ». This statistical profile was different to that of the convicted mur-
derer who « was most likely to be a low-status, Anglo male in his early thirties with 
no dependents » 2 0 . But Strange goes further. « Qualitative evidence adds texture to 
the statistical outline of discrimination », she writes: 
At the micro-level of case studies, we can see that cabinets conducted case reviews 
like primitive lotteries - as if they drew lots to determine whether or not to execute. 
The results were not random because condemned people ended up with different 
combinations of short and long lots representing factors - both legal and extra 
legal - that cabinets considered. The conviction, of course, was a short straw, so 
advocates of the condemned scrambled to find longer ones: steady workers, self-
sacrificing mothers, or beloved members of communities could be constructed as 
persons meriting mercy. Alternatively, people with histories of combativeness, as 
well as outsiders of all sorts, tended to fare poorly. Racist and class-based assump-
tions were also at play, yet these forms of discrimination did not always operate to 
the disadvantage of those sentenced to die. Racist notions of intelligence and 
moral character, for example, could inspire pity for people of «lesser» races. 
Furthermore, persons subjected to colonisation schemes, particularly Aboriginal 
peoples during early phases of contact with whites, were often treated leniently by 
paternalistic cabinets. Some saw their luck shift because their cases arose in the 
wake of a controversial hanging or commutation; others benefitted or suffered 
because their reviews occurred when cabinets were bombarded by lobbyists. In 
other words, patterns of severity were generally disfavourable to the poor, to men, 
and to those from identifiable racial and ethnic groups, but the drawing of lots on 
a case-by-case basis yielded surprises. Such was the drama of capital punishment21. 
1 9
 Strange (1996, pp. 594-561); Strange (ed.) (1996); Strange (1998a, pp. 184-197); Strange (1998b, 
pp. 25-48). 
2 0
 Strange (1998b), summarising material in Avio (1987, pp. 366-379); Avio (1988, pp. 331-349); 
Chandler, (1976); Jayewardene (1977). 
2 1
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It is confusing to call the award of mercy a discriminatory lottery. This is an oxy-
moron like «irresistible impulse». The word irresistible implies the notion of com-
pulsion, while impulse suggests the exact opposite. Similarly, the discrimination 
Strange refers to is not random or arbitrary but its exact opposite. Discrimination 
played an important systematic function in the control of crime. Here, I think, 
Strange was seduced by the linguistic propinquity in the extraordinary fact that the 
Canadian parliament chose in 1953 to establish a Special Joint Committee to inves-
tigate «capital punishment, corporal punishment and lotteries». She was also 
influenced by arguments around the struggle for the abolition of capital punishment 
in the 1950s and 1960s and projected them back into the past. « Although humanita-
rian sentiment motivated most abolitionists, their arguments against cruelty and 
unfairness ultimately proved less persuasive than their charges of irrationality and 
unaccountability in the disposition of capital cases » 2 2 . Unprincipled and partial 
justice, she tells us, led to the abolition of the death penalty. 
Strange also calls the award of mercy a « mystery » 2 3 . Cabinet members refused 
to explain their decisions, claiming executive privilege. She argues that we will 
never know why cabinets chose to hang one man rather than another. « Anecdotal 
evidence was undoubtedly suggestive », she writes, « but it was impossible to prove 
that ethnicity, race or religion or any other single factor swayed the cabinet to opt for 
or against commutation » 2 4 . Under mounting pressure to explain how mercy deci-
sions were reached, the « Capital Case Procedure » manual was published in 1941. 
But Strange claims the manual disclosed very little. «It was one thing to assert that 
certain rules were followed; it was quite another to divulge how those rules were 
applied in practice» 2 5 . Curiously, Strange finds a letter written by a Remission 
Officer asking for a salary raise more revealing of this mystery than the Capital 
Code Manual itself. The letter was written in 1923 by Michael Gallagher, who was 
Chief Officer from 1924 to 1953. The listing of his duties included: « analysis of all 
evidence (...) irregularities at trial (...) consideration of legal points (...) alleged 
impaired mentality (...) collecting data bearing on character... such advice [is] ten-
dered in keeping with the rules of exceptionality and natural equity; the determina-
tion of these rules and their application to each individual case are among the most 
important duties of office.» Strange then concludes from this job description: 
that determining who ought to be executed and who ought to be spared was by no 
means a strict matter of rules and legal procedures. Like jury members' delibera-
tions, remission officers' assessments of factors such as character and community 
feeling were more impressionistic than legalistic. Gallagher discreetly admitted 
that his subjective opinions, as well as his estimation of public opinion and the 
potential for political fall-out, played a pivotal role in determining his recom-
mendations26. 
It is puzzling to read that Strange finds the reasons for mercy a mystery. It is 
puzzling because she says that cabinets and Governor-Generals usually rubber-
2 2
 Strange (1998b, p. 599). 
2 3
 Strange (1998a, p. 184). 
2 4
 Strange (1998b, p. 616). 
2 5
 Strange (1998a, p. 185). 
2 6
 Strange (1998a, p. 195). 
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stamped the recommendation to mercy or execution that the Remissions Branch in 
the Justice Department offered them. Guy Favreau, Minister of Justice in 1941, did 
reveal that he read all the evidence in cases where execution was recommended, but 
only those parts of the evidence drawn to his attention by the Chief Officer of the 
Remissions Branch in cases where mercy was the recommendation. Strange 
concludes from this that the Remissions Branch « exerted enormous influence over 
the executive's final word » 2 7.This appears to be in line with practice in the English 
Home Office. There in the Criminal Department an archive of capital cases was kept 
together with tabulated memoranda of precedents for internal use. Chadwick has 
shown how this store of archival knowledge grew from 1860 so that by 1900 the 
bureaucrats were able to impose on the exercise of mercy « an increasing coherence 
and rationality » 2 8 . 
Yet Strange claims that the Canadian Justice Department kept no historical 
archive of precedents and that decisions were made on a random and ad hoc basis. 
Can this really be true, if the Canadian system was based on English practice ? In 
England the view of the judge was the most important opinion in deciding on mercy. 
Between 1900 and 1950 only six men were executed against the recommendation of 
the judge 2 9 . It is revealing that the only reference Strange makes to the murder law 
or to the mandatory death penalty is in 1961 when two degrees of murder were intro-
duced in Canada. « The immediate effect of the amendment was to spare the branch 
and Cabinet from having to deal with capital cases », she writes, « other than those 
involving convictions for 'planned and deliberate' murders » 3 0 . These are the very 
words used to describe a recommendation for the introduction of a first-degree 
murder in the 1866 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. And if they divided 
murder on this ground in 1961, it is fairly certain that this had been the practice in 
the mercy process for many years before. It is probable that the Canadians followed 
the English trend from the 1930s in restricting hanging to premeditated murders. 
There is a larger question that a « no rules » approach to mercy begs. What was 
the purpose of mercy in capital punishment ? Strange answers: « Mercy was to coun-
terbalance terror, to insure fairness and equity (in the eyes of its supporters) or, as 
detractors charged, to reinforce the legitimacy of a fundamentally unjust political 
and economic order » 3 1 . But there is little in this definition to distinguish mercy exer-
cised in the eighteenth century from mercy in the twentieth century. Did mercy 
remain unchanged over three centuries ? The King's mercy in the eighteenth century 
was undoubtedly arbitrary and served to reinforce in England, as Douglas Hay has 
so incomparably described, the legitimacy of the bloodiest capital code in Europe. 
Even while the power of the gentry to interfere in the exercise of mercy in the nine-
teenth century became circumscribed as the system of government became more 
democratic, the arbitrariness of decisions taken by the King in his Council remained. 
«In no other context was the power over life and death wielded », writes the histo-
rian, Vic Gatrell, « with such remote and capricious disdain » 3 2 . Lord Ellenborough, 
2 7
 Strange (1998a, p. 191). 
2 8
 Chadwick (1992, p. 166). 
29
 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Report, Appendix VI. 
3 0
 Strange (1998a, p. 193). 
3 1
 Strange (1996, p. 599). 
3 2
 Gatrell (1994, p. 543). 
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a member of the King's Council in 1828, was horrified at how decisions over who to 
reprieve and who to condemn were reached: 
I am shocked by the inequality of punishment. At one time a man is hanged for a 
crime (....) because there are few to be hanged, and it is some time since an 
example has been made of capital punishment for this particular offence. At 
another time a man escapes for the same crime (...) because it is a heavy calendar, 
and there are many to be executed. The actual delinquency of the individual is 
comparatively little taken into consideration. Extraneous circumstances deter-
mine his fate33. 
Is this what Strange means when she calls mercy arbitrary, ad hoc, or a lottery in the 
twentieth century ? Surely the bureaucratic exercise of mercy, to use Chadwick's 
term, by the Home Office under the mandatory death penalty for murder from 1861 
and the Justice Department in Canada from 1867 was different in degree and kind 
from the capricious mercy Hay and Gatrell describe ? Surely mercy came to be used, 
as Justice Devlin complained, for the purpose of justice ? Or did the truth about 
mercy lie in Lord Samuel's remark that a degree of uncertainty in marginal cases 
was a good thing in deterring potential murderers 3 5? 
4. - MURDER AND MERCY MYTHS 
Very few murderers were ever brought to trial let alone convicted. Consequently, 
for the purpose of deterrence the most had to be made out of those who were convic-
ted. The aim of judicial punishment was purely exemplary. In 1845 a barrister told 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Law that prosecuting all crime was impossible 
and that the « only attainable object is example ». In 1935 the Home Office admitted 
that the cases prosecuted were no more than a representative selection. Reference to 
these two pieces of evidence was made in a recent revealing article by Howard 
Taylor about criminal statistics and murder in England 3 6. He argues that limited 
finance, and competition between central and local government over payment for 
prosecutions, restricted the number of criminals brought to trial. « Clearly, if the true 
amount of crime had been put down », he writes, «then the deterrent effect would 
have been corroded by the public realisation of the enormous extent of crime that 
went unpunished » 3 7 . It was cheaper and more effective to maintain «the public illu-
sion' that criminals were caught and crime did not pay». 
Taylor argues that the low murder rate in England was a myth. « From the mid-
nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth », he writes, «it was popularly put about that 
murder was not a problem because the English people were so civilised» 3 8. Taylor 
suggests that the low murder rate was the result of prosecution policy and not the 
real incidence of murder. Between 1880 (when the Office of the Director of Public 
3 3
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 Gowers (1956, p. 32) quoting from an article by Lord Devlin in the Criminal Law Review, September 
1954. 
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Prosecutions was created) and 1965 (when capital punishment was abolished) the 
average number of murders recorded each year was 150. Throughout this period the 
number of murders prosecuted fluctuated between 120 and 179. Taylor concludes 
that prosecution for murder was «the most strictly rationed of all crimes» and he 
argues that it was easy for the Director of Public Prosecutions to enforce quotas on 
murder. When the budget for murder was used up, the remaining murders were 
passed back to the police to prosecute at lesser charges. « Most murders did not get 
as far as a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Because the discovery of a 
suspicious death and its subsequent investigation and prosecution could make a 
large dent in a police authority budget, it was an open secret that most murders went 
uninvestigated » 3 9 . He goes further and suggests that sentences were also allotted 
according to quota. And the murder conviction rate in England and Wales between 
1860 and 1950 was a suspiciously consistent 40 per cent. All in all, Taylor concludes 
that punishment had less to do with justice than with «bureaucracy and social 
policy» 4 0 . 
Taylor does not talk about execution by quota, but he might have made a case for 
that as well. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953) was bothe-
red about what appeared to be shifts in the reprieve rates from decade to decade. The 
1930s stand out as a decade of leniency. But if the first half of the twentieth-century 
is divided into pre- and post-1925 periods the figures are 35% and 39% reprieved 
respectively. The Commission feared this four per cent difference might have indi-
cated a change in mercy practice at the Home Office, especially considering the 
growing number of murderers reprieved on account of mental abnormality (despite 
a steady rise in cases of insanity on arraignment and guilty but insane verdicts). 
They did not suspect that premeditation had become the key to hanging murderers 
and concluded simply that there was an «increased tendency to leniency» 4 1 . 
Moreover, the Commission was told that sharp statistical variations were inevitable 
when dealing with a crime as heterogeneous as murder. «The figures for men still 
show considerable fluctuation from one decade to another», it noted: 
but they do not support any firm inference unless it were assumed that the pro-
portion of heinous to less heinous murders remains approximately constant. That 
is not so. Murders are heterogeneous, and even in a period of 10 years the 
numbers are so small that fortuitous circumstances (such as the variations in the 
number of murders of wives, sweethearts and mistresses, or the recent increase in 
the number of murders in connection with robbery and sexual assault, to which 
the Home Office drew attention) have an exagerrated effect on the percentages42. 
The Commission also noted that Scottish mercy had always been more lenient than 
English mercy and that there had been no executions in Scotland between 1928 and 
1945. Part of the reason for this was that « Scottish juries can and do return a verdict 
of culpable homicide on the ground of diminished responsibility in cases of lesser 
mental abnormality, where in England a verdict of murder would be inevitable » 4 3 . 
3 9
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The reprieve rate in Canada lurched from decade to decade. In the 1870s over 70 
per cent of murderers were reprieved; in the 1910s about 50 per cent; and in the 
1930s only 25 per cent (in sharp contrast to England) 4 4. The conclusion Strange 
draws from these swings is that the award of mercy was arbitrary. « These statistics 
were not printed on a yearly basis, but unprecedented execution rates and erratic 
swings in severity and mercy raised troubling questions for concerned observers », 
she writes. «What could account for such dramatic shifts in execution and commu-
tation patterns if capital case review procedures were systematic and impartial ?» 4 5 . 
The answer is most obviously politics. It should comes as no surprise that exe-
cution rates were unstable in colonies where the process of colonialism involved the 
conquest and incorporation of indigenous peoples and the suppression of working 
class struggles. Hanging rebels and strikers made as big an impact on the statistics 
as hanging ten Chinese for a robbery murder on the Rand in 1910. Hanging rows of 
men for ritual murders had a similar effect in the early years of the twentieth century. 
This explains the anomaly of liberal Lord Gladstone's hanging record in South 
Africa. As Home Secretary in England (1905-1910), he was a weak believer in 
capital punishment. But as Governor-General in South Africa he allowed more men 
to hang in 1910 and 1911 than any of his pre-1948 successors. 
Gladstone relied on exemplary hangings to control witch murder in specific 
areas. More than a half of those hanged in 1911 were witch murderers. « When they 
come before me whether as Governor General or High Commissioner», he wrote, 
«I pay attention to what the likeliest authority, who knows the district where the 
crime is committed, says with regard to deterrence. And I have several times refer-
red cases back for such opinion». Then if the incidence of witch murder was 
growing, he allowed «the law to take its course» in order to make an example. He 
summed up the policy he followed in these cases in the following way: « Where it is 
clear that murder is due to smelling out, to prevalent native superstitions, to 
ignorance and a low order of intelligence, the death penalty should not be inflicted 
unless competent local authorities think it essential for public reasons » 4 6 . 
Gladstone's essentially arbitrary policy of capital punishment for witch murder was 
replaced by a more individualistic approach to mercy by his successor, Lord Buxton. 
The death sentence was carried into effect when the doctor himself was the murde-
rer and commuted when the murderers had killed the wizard (or witch) indicated by 
the doctor 4 7. 
More importantly the aim of hanging was, as Lord Gladstone indicated, the 
exemplary one of deterrence. At the turn of the century British Governor-Generals 
had little doubt that the judicious use of the mercy prerogative did much to legiti-
mate their right to rule colonial peoples. For example, in 1910 Louis Botha, the 
Prime Minister of South Africa, warned Gladstone that if he commuted a rape death 
sentence there «wd be strong feeling in Rhodesia, & the whites would believe the 
woman». Botha also told him that there «had been dangerous feeling some time 
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ago, but an execution had up to now stopped outrages » 4 8 . But Gladstone kept his 
own counsel and commuted. Governor-Generals continued to apply capital punish-
ment in an exemplary fashion where they saw murder or crime growing in a parti-
cular region. «Judging by the number of cases from Natal which are now being 
submitted to YRH», wrote the secretary to Prince Arthur, Governor-General, in 
1921, «it is evident that the crime of murder is on the increase in that Province, and 
it seems clearly desirable that the law should be allowed to take its course in this 
case» 4 9 . But the exemplary function of hanging changed in political and moral time. 
By the 1930s the role of the imperial British Governor-General was over in the 
South African mercy process; in 1937 the first South African, Patrick Duncan, was 
appointed Governor-General; and thereafter Governor-Generals never vetoed a 
cabinet recommendation on a death-penalty offence. 
5. - SOUTH AFRICA: HYBRID MERCY RULES 
In South Africa the reprieve rate in the first half of the twentieth century was 
close to 80 per cent, much higher than both England and Canada. But in South 
Africa few murderers were found insane on arraignment or « guilty but insane » in 
trials and it is difficult as a result to make a clear comparison. What can be said is 
that over the first half of the twentieth century the pattern of reprieves followed the 
English with mercy becoming more lenient from the 1930s. The mercy reports from 
this time reveal a much closer concern with premeditation and the motives for 
murder. In 1935 the mandatory death penalty for murder was abolished in an attempt 
to shift the growing burden of processing hanging cases from the Executive to the 
courts. But prior to 1935 the South African mercy process was modelled on practice 
in the Home Office. In the National Archives of South Africa capital case files 
containing material similar to those in the Canadian archives have been kept for pos-
terity, but unlike the Canadian Archives any quantifiable information has to be 
prised out by hand. For the period between 1910 and 1947 there are 1536 capital 
case files, of which I have sampled 384 5 0 . 
What do these files reveal about the mystery of mercy ? Comparison of gain and 
passion murders or of racial with intra-racial murders tell us very little about how 
mercy was awarded. The maintenance of social and racial hierarchy was always a 
predominant factor in these cases. Let us consider three similar intra-racial domes-
tic murders for an insight into the secret negotiations over life and death. The first 
involved the murder of a sexual rival. In 1920 Hubert Fisher, a forty-one year-old 
divorced mechanic, was in love with twenty-five-year-old Mary Davidson. He 
boarded with her family in Kimberley, a town built around diamond mining. When 
she transferred her affections to a younger man, recently returned from service 
during the war, it was too much for the older man to bear. He owned an automobile 
and considered himself a good deal better than that «damned common Tommy 
Knight». He shot his rival dead on the night Mary Davidson announced her enga-
4 8
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gement to the younger man. «It would seem only too clear from all the evidence», 
concluded Judge de Waal in his confidential report, «that the prisoner after he had 
located Knight and Miss Davidson on the seat deliberately returned to his room to 
fetch his loaded pistol and that after he had made sure on his return that the couple 
on the seat were the two he wanted deliberately and intentionally fired at and killed 
Knight, and it is difficult to see how the Jury, who were unanimous in their verdict, 
could have arrived at any other conclusion» 5 1 . 
The proof of deliberation was only reached after an accumulation of evidence 
revealed a motive of revenge. The most convincing piece of evidence lay in a diary 
Fisher kept on the counsel of the Efficiency Association « which advised pupils to 
analyse their perplexities ». Instead of providing a record of despair, Judge de Waal 
believed he kept the diary because he was brooding on revenge. « As it stands the 
Diary, if a curious self revelation, furnishes the strongest evidence of malice » 5 2 . He 
even reached the conclusion that Fisher's interest in Davidson was «entirely sensual 
and material», a conclusion the defence unwittingly reinforced. 
Advocate Krause K.C., the best trial lawyer in the land, made a defence out of 
jealousy and a broken promise of marriage to suggest an unhinged mind. He subjec-
ted Davidson to a remorseless cross-examination to show that she had allowed 
Fisher «to take undue liberties with her modesty», that is, have regular sexual inter-
course with her over the previous four years. But medical evidence revealed that 
Davidson was a virgin and so his defence back-fired. Instead, the jury believed he 
had made an underhand attack on her honour, and he was unable to convince them 
that he had only put her veracity to a stern test. Thus, Fisher's fate was sealed. «The 
mere fact that he had rightly or wrongly come to regard Miss Davidson as his future 
wife», wrote the Minister of Justice, « cannot be entertained as an extenuation for 
the deliberate murder of which he was rightly found guilty (...)»5 3. 
This conclusion of deliberate murder conceals more than it reveals. First, in the 
post-war decade judges were harsh on white working men who plead jealousy as 
excuse for murder. The power of the white working class was particularly threate-
ning to social hierarchy in the light of the apparent success of communism after the 
war. Second, Knight was the son of a large employer of white labour in Kimberley 
and had a «pull» on the jury. And third, Fisher won no sympathy from the Judge, 
whose opinion carried the most weight in the mercy process. «No Britisher», he 
said in the last letter he wrote, « should be tried by a Dutch judge ». 
The second case has much in common with the first. But here a murder was 
judged to be both deliberate and impulsive. In 1926 the twenty-three-year-old 
Herman Charles Bosman, who was to become South Africa's most famous comic 
writer 5 4, was sentenced to death for the murder of his step-brother. The Judge, jury, 
Prosecutor, Attorney-General, Law Adviser and Minister of Justice all believed he 
had deliberately killed his step-brother. Yet his defence was that he shot his step-
brother by accident. «In that tragic minute, the happenings of which are still not 
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clear to me », Bosman said, «I was impelled by some wild and chaotic impulse in 
which there was no suggestion of malice or premeditation». A more conniving and 
disingenuous statement was difficult to imagine. He had been well coached by an 
excellent advocate. But he did not fool Judge van Pittius. In his eyes Bosman 
behaved like a guilty man after the killing rather than someone who had been the 
cause of a fatal accident. The unavoidable fact was that Bosman loaded the rifle 
before shooting his step-brother. So the Judge sentenced him to death in court as the 
law required under a mandatory death penalty for murder. But the road to a reprieve 
had already begun with the favourable impression the Judge formed of Bosman 
during the trial. He was stunned by Bosman's imagination and sensitivity. In the 
privacy of his mercy report he prayed not only for a reprieve, but for a short sen-
tence. 
The Judge left it to others to explain to the Governor-General what he meant by 
his mercy recommendation. The acting Attorney-General wrote: «What he clearly 
excludes in this case is anything in the nature of a calm contemplation of the result 
of the act, which he was about to perform» 5 5 . This was, in fact, the precise meaning 
of the word deliberate. The Prosecutor added: «The Court found that the shooting 
was deliberate but I feel sure that the presiding Judge will agree that it was done on 
the impulse of the moment» 5 6 . The Minister of Justice put the case into a broader 
perspective. Bosman considered his mother had remarried into a « common » family 
soon after his father's death and regarded himself as a stranger in her house in 
Johannesburg. «There is no doubt that his unhappy family relationship preyed upon 
his mind», he said, repeating a hint from the Judge. Thus the Minister's mercy 
recommendation was formulated as follows: 
I am satisfied that prior to the altercation between Pierre Bosman and David 
Russell there was no contemplation of murder or bodily harm in the mind of the 
accused, but at the moment when he heard the altercation he took up the rifle with 
deadly intent and deliberately used it in circumstances in which a simple inter-
vention in the struggle going on between his brother and Russell would have 
afforded adequate protection to the former. At the same time, having regard to the 
state of mind of prisoner and to the sudden impulse which influenced him, I think 
the justice of the case would be met by a commutation of the sentence to impri-
sonment for a term less than the usual life-long period57. 
He recommended ten years. Bosman received this sentence, but served under four 
before he was released on probation. 
What made Bosman's brooding over his unhappy family situation more deser-
ving of sympathy than Fisher's obvious distress at losing the love of his life? As 
with Fisher's murder there were a number of other issues that influenced the 
outcome of the case. First, the motive of revenge was by no means as clear in a 
sibling as in a sexual-rival murder, although a short story written by Bosman about 
the murder of a brother was put into the record as evidence of premeditation. 
Second, Bosman was « a well educated but imaginative and sensitive youth » at the 
beginning of a career as a teacher. Third, he was a leader of the White League, an 
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anti-Communist organisation whose goal was the maintenance of white supremacy 
in South Africa. He had taken part in breaking up Communist meetings, been threa-
tened with violence for his pains and given police protection. Fourth, Bosman, who 
was of Dutch origin, was tried by a sympathetic Dutch Judge 5 8 . 
The third murder illustrates the most distasteful form of South African mercy. 
Here mercy was granted as a political favour. On 20 August 1920 Chief Matlala 
killed Elias Lemola, his subject and Pietersburg District leader of the Transvaal 
African Congress. The case for the defence was that Lemola had been caught naked 
in the hut of one of Matlala's ten wives. Matlala « killed him in a fit of rage induced 
by this violation of the chastity of his wife and of his own honour ». In his version of 
events the killing took place inside the hut at 11 p.m and then the body was taken 
outside into the night light to see who the victim was. The case for the Crown was 
that much earlier, at sunset, Lemola was found in the skerm outside Maria's hut 
about to take an evening meal. Matlala and his brother killed him outside the hut 
with a kaffir hoe (like a pick axe), forcibly undressed him to make him look like an 
adulterer and carried his body inside the hut. The motive for the crime was that the 
Transvaal African Congress was undermining Matlala's authority. 
What was crucial to the outcome of this case was the popularity of Matlala 
amongst the white farmers of the district. His popularity had deep roots. Chief 
Matlala's ancestors had a long history of loyalty to the Boer Republic in the 
Transvaal and after the Anglo-Boer War Matlala continued to win words of praise 
from Native Affairs officials and white farmers. What this meant was that Matlala 
was tried by a jury of white farmers who were his peers rather than his enemies. 
Moreover, for his defence he had been able to engage the famous advocate Krause 
K.C. 
Yet even with the odds stacked in Matlala's favour, the jury found him guilty of 
a deliberate murder. There were a number of reasons for the jury's verdict, but the 
blood evidence was the most convincing. In fact, the whole case turned, in true 
Rumpole style, on bloodstains. They revealed whether Lemola was killed inside or 
outside the hut. If he was killed inside the hut, then Matlala was guilty of a justifiable 
culpable homicide on the grounds of provocation. If he was killed outside the hut, 
then Matlala was guilty of a « wicked murder » committed out of political animosity 
and he deserved to hang. The biggest blood stain was outside the hut. «The medical 
evidence was conclusive», wrote the Prosecutor, Eugene Marais, « on the point that 
the greatest and strongest rush of blood would take place immediately after the arte-
ries in the neck had been severed and while the heart was still acting » 5 9 . There were 
spots of blood all over the skerm that suggested a great struggle had taken place. 
Lemola suffered ten wounds. What the blood stains indicated was that he had been 
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killed outside, wrapped in a kaross and then carried into the hut twelve hours later. 
Post-mortem haemorrhage accounted for the blood stain on the hut floor and the 
shaking of the kaross for the blood spots high on the wall. 
Despite the verdict of the jury, Judge Curlewis thought there was some doubt in 
the case. As always the judge's opinion weighed most heavily in the scales of mercy. 
He thought the eight-to-one jury verdict indicated some of the problems in reaching 
a clear decision. He pointed out that Maria was an interested witness who was refu-
ting a charge of infidelity. Her sister and her brother supported her version of events. 
All had reason to be hostile to Matlala. He had burned their huts and turned them out 
of the hoofstad two years before on account of her family's refusal to allow her sister 
to marry Matlala. Consequently, he believed something of the defence and recom-
mended commutation 6 0. 
The judge was not alone in arguing for a reprieve. A monster petition from 
whites in the Pietersburg District prayed for mercy. In addition, the Department of 
Native Affairs wrote «that Matlala has always been loyal and ready to assist the 
Government in regulating the affairs of his tribe». The Chief Native Commissioner 
in Natal, who had been the former Magistrate and Native Commissioner of 
Pietersburg, wrote that the case deserved the «most sympathetic consideration». 
Even though the Minister of Justice noted that he was happy to accept the verdict of 
the jury, this phalanx of white opinion was hard to resist. He followed their lead and 
recommended life for both men 6 1 . 
That was not the end of the matter. It was up to the Governor-General, Prince 
Arthur of Connaught, the third son of Queen Victoria, to make the final decision. On 
the chronological schedule of his copy of the mercy record the following was 
written in pencil by his secretary, G. Hazelrigg: «Chief and his brother murder 
leader of the 'Kongres' - Some element of doubt about the real circs of the murder 
- Agree to commute to life sentence in both cases». There was subsequently a sea-
change in opinion at the Executive Council meeting. Astonishment at what transpi-
red was shown in the cryptic exchange of minutes on the cover of the mercy file. 
«The Minister recommended that the death sentence in each case be commuted to 
imprisonment for life», minuted a clerk in the Governor-General's office. «Mr 
Hazlerigg concurred but the sentence in each case, as approved in Ex Co, has been 
altered to two years». Below was written another minute noting that the Clerk of the 
Executive Council was certain this was «in accordance with decision of H.R.H.». 
Mr Hazlerigg then asked Prince Arthur: «I understand that two years is correct?» 
And Prince Arthur simply initialled the minute without comment. 
6.-CONCLUSION 
A consideration of these three cases suggests that the South African exercise of 
mercy took elements from the three interpretations of Radzinowicz and Hood, 
Chadwick, and Strange. The combination of both legal and moral and arbitrary posi-
tions is confirmed by the way mercy was exercised in South Africa. There is little 
doubt that a deliberate and planned murder was the basic standard against which the 
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death penalty was measured. Radzinowicz and Hood were quite right on this point. 
Yet it is equally clear that some deliberate murders, like the one committed by 
Bosman, were excused by some mitigating factor, such as who the murderer and his 
victim were and the position they occupied in the racial or social hierarchy, while 
many others were hanged for deliberate murders alone. Here Chadwick was correct. 
There is also little doubt that many men were executed for impulsive or unpremedi-
tated murders, while many more were reprieved. Here there was nothing to choose 
between exemplary justice from the point of view of criminal deterrence and the 
Strange view of arbitrariness from the point of view of the murderer hanged. 
The turning point was the 1930s and the impact of the Great Depression. In 
England and in South Africa, but not in Canada, mercy became more lenient the-
reafter than ever before. There was a much closer attention to the mind of the mur-
derer and premeditation became the litmus test of a bad murder. Yet the law itself 
remained conservative. In 1935 a Bill that differentiated between two degrees of 
murder on the basis of premeditation was rejected by the South African Parliament 
and replaced instead by the introduction of «extenuating circumstances» in the 
murder law. This was solidly in line with the English law that had been indigenised 
in South Africa over the previous hundred years. The law on murder was designed 
to stamp out all homicidal violence, whether it was premeditated or impulsive. 
Yet after 1935 there was a de facto movement towards punishing by the death 
penalty only murders containing both the elements of deliberation and planning. 
After the War the use of the word deliberate disappeared from the mercy reports and 
premeditation came to be the code word for execution. Between 1960 and 1990 the 
General Bar Council judged that the death sentence was likely to be imposed in 
cases where: «(a) the murder was committed in the course of some other crime, par-
ticularly robbery and rape; (b) the murder was carefully planned and premeditated 
or fell in the category of a 'contract' killing; (c) the circumstances of the commis-
sion of the crime were attended by peculiar and marked brutality» 6 2. 
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